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T"(e p (P)) dP From , ve tnov that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a menu of linear contracts defined by :
here C is the announced cost and C the realized cost. b(C°) defines the sharing of overruns and is equal to T'(e p (&) Taxing z(.) as given, the shareholders maximize their expected profit subject to the managers'incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
We ailov the shareholders to offer incentive schemes such that some high (3 types do not vant to produce. Let $1 denote the "cut-off type", i.e. the type vho is indifTerent betveen producing and not producing.
Managers receive v(C) as veil as the benefit of their investment. A, and incur a disutility^(e). Their utility level is:
A-<F(e(P)).
From the point of viev of the managers v(.) plays the same role as U.) in Section 3 and therefore, incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are as in Section 3-Accordingly, the shareholders' optimization program is (using v(c(p) ) -U(0) -A ?(e(P))) : r(e"(P)) -1 -(1-T) r(p-e"(P)) --j^¥ "(e B <p)).
(4.12) either {s-(l*X)(pr-e"(P t **)) -A* From the managers' first order incentive compatibility condition ve have :
Multiplying (4.3) by-r (1-T), adding to (4.11) and using (4.13) yields : 1«A (4.14) r(e,(p)) -1-^-(2-t)^r-(e t (p)).
In equilibrium P^-P»**. From (4.13) and (4.4) (4.15) r(p-e,(P))-z(p-e,(p)) -Jf'(e ,(£)) (l-i,#))dP * A-*(e t (p;)). (4.20) f" -2" -r" ---r (2-T) r"> 0.
l.Jt
That is, the net revard of the agent. v(.), is convex in cost as in LaffontTirole [19861. In Ve nov summarize our main conclusions. )J betveenz((P-e»(|J)) and (minus) r^ff-e,^)) is arbitrary at the Nash equilibrium as long as the left-hand sides in (4.6) and (4.12) are non-negative.
For lover levels of S. P»* differs from P and is (uniquely) defined by : In this case, z((P,*) -e»(P, # )) and r((P»*) -e,(P,*)) are uniquely defined by (4.6) and (4.12). That the principals* transfers are either determinate or defined up to a constant should not surprise the reader familiar with the theory of public goods. la the cue of a corner solution (£,* -(J) See Sappington-Stigiitz (1987) . Rionkn (1988) . Vickers and Yarrov (1983) for interesting discussions of the theoretical issues related to privatization.
2)
In a recent case in point, regulators in Syracuse tried to force a utility to raise managerial incentives.
3)
In particular if bargaining takes place under asymmetric information, inefficiencies vill typically result, as pointed out in Milgrom-Rpberts (1987) and Holmstrom-Tirole (1989b Note that in equilibrium p -E(l-T) (z -v) . Hovever it is important to treat it P as a sunk revenue for the government That is, by changing its regulatory process today, the government does not affect the price that the public paid for the shares.
7)
Under our assumption, the stockholders are actually indifferent betveen ordering the managers to reallocate or not. It In independent vork. Stole (1990) 
